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The paper surveys the Choo Siow (CS) marriage matching model and its extensions.
CS derives a behavioral marriage matching function. The collective model of intra-
household allocations can be integrated into this framework. Spousal labor supplies
respond to changing marriage market conditions. Marriage market tightness, the ratio
of unmarried type i men to unmarried type j women is a su¢ cient statistic for marriage
market conditions for those types of individuals. The hypothesis that spousal labor
supplies vary to equilibrate the marriage market has overidentifying restrictions. The
framework extends to a dynamic marriage matching environment. Empirically, this
paper shows how the famine caused by the great leap forward in Sichuan a⁄ected
the marital behavior of famine born cohorts. Marriage market tightness is shown to
be a useful statistic for summarizing marriage market conditions in the United States.
Marriage market conditions in the contemporary United States primarily a⁄ect spousal
labor force participation rather than hours of work.How does the marriage market clear? An empirical framework.
Who marries whom, and how does the marriage market clear, are two classic questions
in the study of marriage markets.1 There are few empirical studies on these questions
because economists are just beginning to estimate bilateral matching models, and inter-
spousal transfers in modern societies are di¢ cult to observe.2
The objective of this paper is to survey and extend research by my coauthors and I on
these two questions. Choo Siow (2006; hereafter CS) proposed and estimated a marriage
matching function (MMF). A marriage matching function maps population supplies to who
marries whom. The bene￿ts of the CS MMF are: (1) It is non-parametric and easy to
estimate; (2) It has behavioral foundations.3
An application of CS is in Brandt, Siow and Vogel (2008; hereafter BSV) who used it
to study the e⁄ects of the famine in China caused by the great leap forward on the marital
behavior of the famine born cohorts.
When agents decide who to marry or whether to marry, they have to anticipate their
allocation of resources for each marital choice. To model these within marital behavior,
Choo, Seitz and Siow (2008a, 2008b; hereafter CSSa and CSSb) nests the collective model
of intra-household behavior with the CS framework .The collective model is an empirically
tractable model of intra-household allocation where household members may have divergent
interests (Chiappori (1988, 1992); Donni (2005) ; Vermeulen (2002)). Building on Blundell,
Chiappori and Meghir (2005), our collective marriage matching model provides a solution to
the long standing search for an empirical model of marriage matching and intra-household
1How does the marriage market clear? An empirical framework.
allocations.4
Marriage market conditions a⁄ect inter-spousal bargaining power. What is a useful em-
pirical proxy for marriage market conditions? Researchers have primarily focused on the own
sex ratio, the ratio of population supplies of the type of the husband, i, to the population
supplies of the type of the wife, j. But as the own sex ratio changes, the sex ratios of spousal
substitutes are also changing. Thus ignoring the availability of spousal substitutes makes it
di¢ cult to interpret the results of these studies. We provide an alternative empirical proxy
for marriage market condition, marriage market tightness, which incorporates the e⁄ects of
spousal substitutes.5 Section 4.2 shows that changes in marriage market tightness a⁄ect
spousal labor supplies. While we and other researchers (E.g. Angrist (2002); Chiappori,
Fortin and Lacroix (2002; hereafter CFL); Grossbard-Shectman (1993)) show that changes
in marriage market conditions a⁄ect spousal labor supplies, it is not known if spousal labor
supplies adjust su¢ ciently to clear the marriage market. To answer such a question, we
need to estimate a structural model of spousal labor supplies and marriage matching. CSSb
proposes and estimates such a model. Section 5.2 sketches how this is done.
Another restrictive feature of CS is that it is a static MMF whereas marital behavior is
fundamentally dynamic. An individual may choose to remain unmarried today in order to
marry in the future. Thus we need to develop dynamic MMF￿ s. Choo Siow (2007) begins
that agenda
Finally, the empirical framework here assumes away the problem of unobserved hetero-
geneity. We currently do not know how to estimate equilibrium bilateral matching models
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with two sided unobserved heterogeneity.
Sections 1 and 2 will exposit marriage matching functions and the CS model respectively.
Section 3 summarizes BSV. Section 4 presents the collective marriage matching model. Sec-
tions 4.2 and 5.2 discuss labor supplies and marriage market clearing. Section 6 sketches
an overlapping generations dynamic MMF where the number of entrants into the marriage
market is time varying.
1 Marriage matching functions6
Building on the classic model of Leslie (1945), demographers use one-sex models to em-
pirically model population growth. However, empirical male versus female one sex models
of population growth lead to contradictory implications. These contradictions arise to a
large part because one sex models, by construction, do not impose consistent mating and
reproductive behavior across the two genders.
In order to construct empirical two sex models of population growth, researchers have to
￿rst provide tractable empirical models of mating behavior, or who marries whom.7 Demog-
raphers construct MMFs to model who marries whom.
Let there be I types of men and J types of women. M is a population vector where
element mi is the number of eligible (single) type i men. F is a population vector where
element fj is the number of eligible (single) type j women. ￿ is a vector of exogenous
parameters. A marriage matching function (MMF) is an I ￿ J matrix ￿(M;F;￿) whose
fi;jg element is ￿ij, the number of type i men married to type j women:
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￿ij = ￿ij(M;F;￿); 8 i;j (1)
Let ￿i0 and ￿0j be the numbers of unmarried type i men and type j women respectively.








￿ij = mi 8 i (3)
￿i0;￿0j;￿ij ￿ 0 8 i;j (4)
Equations (2) and (3) say that the sum of all participants for the marital choices by type
j women and type i must sum up to the supplies of type j women and type i men respec-
tively. Equation (4) says that each marital choice must have non-negative participants. The
accounting constraints are important because marriage rates for some types of individuals
are close to 1. Thus MMFs which ignore accounting constraints will often result in predicted
marriage rates above 1.
Although the objective has been known for some time, it has been di¢ cult to come
up with empirically tractable and yet behaviorally attractive MMFs.8 The main di¢ culty is
how to deal with alternative spousal choices while minimizing a priori identifying restrictions.







= ￿ij; 8i;j (5)
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￿ij, which represent ￿forces of attraction￿ , are parameters to be estimated. This MMF
is attractive because it is non-parametric and easy to estimate. However, it has three de￿-
ciencies. First, it ignores the problem of alternative spousal choices. Changes in mi0 or fj0
do not a⁄ect ￿ij. Second, the accounting constraints, (2) to (4), are not imposed. As shown
below, this problem leads to nonsensical predicted marital behavior in an actual application.
Finally, it has no coherent behavioral foundation.
2 Choo Siow9
CS provides a framework to derive empirically tractable and behaviorally consistent MMFs.
Start by considering each marital match between two di⁄erent types of individuals as
a distinct marriage market. With I types of men and J types of women, there are I ￿ J
submarriage markets.
In an fi;jg marriage, a systematic marriage surplus which depends on the type of the
match, ￿ij, is generated. Let e ￿ij be the share of the surplus that is obtained by the wife.
Each type j wife also gets an idiosyncratic payo⁄which depends on her speci￿c identity, and
the type of spouse that she marries and not his speci￿c identity. Her idiosyncratic payo⁄
also does not depend on e ￿ij.
In an fi;jg marriage, ￿ij ￿ e ￿ij is the share of marital surplus that is obtained by the
husband. Each type i husband also gets an idiosyncratic payo⁄ that is speci￿c to him, and
the type of spouse that he marries and not her speci￿c identity. His idiosyncratic payo⁄also
does not depend on ￿ij ￿ e ￿ij. The above assumptions imply that every type i male regards
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every type j female as perfect spousal substitutes and vice versa.
Each individual also gets a systematic payo⁄ from remaining unmarried which depends
on their type as well as an idiosyncratic payo⁄ which depends on their speci￿c identity.
Given their payo⁄s, both systematic and idiosyncratic, from every potential spousal choice
including remaining unmarried, each individual will choose the spousal choice which maxi-
mizes their utility. Note that concern over di⁄erent spousal choices are automatically built
into the individual￿ s choice problem.
Given e ￿ij, we can solve each individual￿ s spousal choice problem. We can aggregate these
individual decisions into demand and supply functions for spouses in every fi;jg submarriage
market.
Finally, we solve for the matrix of e ￿ij which will equilibrate demand with supply in every
submarriage market simultaneously.
The equilibrium distribution of marriages is a function of population vectors and ex-
ogenous parameters which determine the systematic and idiosyncratic payo⁄s. Thus this
equilibrium distribution of marriages is a MMF.
This framework for constructing MMF has three bene￿ts. First, it is behaviorally co-
herent. Second, considerations of alternative spousal choices are built into the framework.
Third, in equilibrium, all accounting constraints, (2) to (4) are automatically satis￿ed.
What remains is to ￿nd convenient functional forms to implement the above framework.
An important assumption in CS is transferable utilities (constant marginal utilities of in-
come). As will be shown below, this restriction is necessary for identi￿cation if we only have
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marriage matching data.
Let the utility of male g of type i who marries a female of type j be:
vijg = ￿ij ￿ e ￿ij + "ijg (6)
As discussed above, ￿ij ￿ e ￿ij is the systematic marital share of the husband. "ijg is his
idiosyncratic payo⁄. Assume that "ijg is an i.i.d. type I extreme value random variable.10
If he chooses to remain unmarried, denoted by j = 0, his utility will be:
vi0g = ￿i0 + "i0g (7)
where "i0g is also an idiosyncratic payo⁄ which is another i.i.d. extreme value random
variable.
This man g can choose to marry one of J types of spouses or not to marry. The utility





ij be the number of type i men who want type j spouses. When there are many






= ￿ij ￿ e ￿ij ￿ ￿i0 (9)
Turning to the marital choices of women, let the utility of female k of type j who marries
a male of type i be:
Vijk = e ￿ij + ￿ijk (10)
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As discussed above, e ￿ij is the systematic marital share of the wife. ￿ijk is her idiosyncratic
payo⁄. Assume that ￿ijk is an i.i.d. extreme value random variable.
If she chooses to remain unmarried, denoted by i = 0, her utility will be:
V0jk = ￿0j + ￿0jk (11)
where ￿0jk is also an idiosyncratic payo⁄ which is another i.i.d. extreme value random
variable.
This woman k can choose to marry one of I types of spouses or not to marry. The utility




Let ￿ij be the number of type j women who want type i spouses. When there are many




= e ￿ij ￿ ￿0j (13)
For every I ￿ J submarriage market, let e ￿ij = ￿ij be the female equilibrium share of
marital surplus in the fi;jg submarriage market which equilibrates the demand and supply
of spouses in all submarkets simultaneously. In this case, the equilibrium number of fi;jg
marriages, ￿ij, will satisfy:
￿ij = ￿
ij = ￿ij 8 i;j (14)
CSSa shows existence of marriage market equilibrium for a more general class of models.
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Imposing marriage market clearing, (14), to the quasi-demand equation, (9), and to the













￿0j; are observable by the researcher. However, observing the two
net gains is not su¢ cient to identify the four unknowns, ￿ij, ￿ij, ￿i0 and ￿0j. Moreover, ￿ij
is endogenous. Thus net gains will change as population supplies change.





￿ij ￿ ￿i0 ￿ ￿0j
2
= ￿ij 8 i;j (17)
CS calls the left hand side of (17) the total gains to marriage. It is equal to ratio of
the number of marriages to the geometric average of the unmarrieds. The right hand side,
￿ij, is equal to the systematic marital surplus of an fi;jg marriage minus their systematic
surpluses from not marrying.
￿ij is ￿xed; it does not depend on population supplies. Moreover, the left hand side of
(17) is observable. Thus we can estimate ￿ij.
The CS MMF is non-parametric. It will ￿t any cross section marriage distribution as
long as there is no thin cell. ￿ij, ￿i0 and ￿0j are not separately identi￿ed. The discussion
here assumes ￿ij as a primitive. CS assumes that ￿ij depends on the separate spousal
contributions to marital surplus. These separate spousal contributions are not identi￿ed.
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There are I ￿ J total gains and I ￿ J unknown parameters, ￿ij. The CS MMF is just
identi￿ed.
Since not all structural parameters are identi￿ed, in what sense is CS MMF a marriage
matching function? Let ￿ be the matrix of total gains parameters where a typical element
is ￿ij. CS shows that:
Proposition 1 Consider an equilibrium distribution of marriages, ￿, with population vec-
tors M and F, and parameter matrix ￿. The equilibrium distribution of marriages varies
uniquely for small variations in M, F and ￿.
The above proposition says that, for small changes in population vectors and ￿, the CS
MMF is a MMF as de￿ned in section 1. The question of global uniqueness remains open.
Although there are substitution e⁄ects in the CS MMF, their analytic properties are not
fully understood.
The transferable utilities (constant marginal utilities of income) assumption is necessary
for identi￿cation of the MMF with only marriage matching data. Without transferable
utilities, parameters which determine the marginal utilities of income will also need to be
identi￿ed and the MMF will be unidenti￿ed without additional restrictions. CSSa and CSSb
extend the model beyond transferable utilities and bring in additional data, spousal labor
supplies, to identify parameters.
Unlike Dagsvik￿ s MMF, the CS MMF is homogenous of degree one in population supplies.
Botticini and Siow (2007) provides evidence from three di⁄erent societies which shows that
the constant returns to scale assumption for marriage markets is reasonable. CS uses the
MMF to study how the legalization of abortion in the United States a⁄ected the demand for
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marriage. Choo Siow (2006a) uses it to study marriage and cohabitation in contemporary
Canada.
Although not discussed in CS, another result is immediate. Subtract male net gains,













￿0j is the log ratio of the equilibrium number of unmarried type i men to unmarried
type j women. We call Tij = ln
￿i0
￿0j marriage market tightness. Tij summarizes marriage
market conditions for the fi;jg match.
Equation (18) implies:
Proposition 2 Holding marital outputs, ￿ij, ￿i0 and ￿0j, constant, the equilbrium share
of marital output which accrues to the wife, ￿ij, is increasing in marriage market tightness,
Tij.
Finally,
Proposition 3 For every fi;jg, the net gains equations, (15) and (16), imply (17) and (18)
and vice versa.
3 Famine and marriage in China 11
An economic and social experiment, the great leap forword in 1959-1961, resulted in the
largest 20th century famine in China. The famine drastically reduced the birth rates in
those years thereby a⁄ecting the sex ratio for customary spousal age di⁄erence for the famine
a⁄ected birth cohorts.
Sichuan province was hard hit by the famine which also disproportionately a⁄ected the
countryside. Figure 1 shows the number of individuals in rural Sichuan by age in 1990. The
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￿gure shows, between the two vertical lines, that there were substantially fewer individuals
between ages 29 to 31, who were born during the great leap, relative to adjacent ages.
Figure 2 shows that the sex ratio (ratio of men to women) of the famine born cohorts did
not substantially change relative to their adjacent age cohorts. However the sex ratios at
the customary spousal age di⁄erence (males being three years older) for the famine a⁄ected
cohorts were substantially a⁄ected. Famine born men and women faced a surplus of their
customary aged spouses. On the other hand, pre famine born men and post famine born
women faced a de￿cit of their customary aged spouses.
[Insert Figures 1, 2, 3 4 here]
Figure 3 and 4 show the 1990 male and female marriage rates by age respectively. For
both genders, the marriage rates of the famine a⁄ected cohorts were relatively small. Small
marriage rate changes are consistent with what other researchers have found with other
large exogenous demographic changes. This ￿nding led previous researchers to argue that
individuals are ￿ exible in their spousal choice (E.g. Bergstrom and Lam (1994); Bhrolchain
(2001); Esteve and CabrØ (2004)).
Since famine born cohorts were small relative to adjacent aged birth cohorts, small
changes in their marriage rates imply that they were ￿discriminated￿against in the marriage
market. In other words, marital surpluses with famine born spouses must have been low rel-
ative to other types of spouses. If their marital surpluses did not change, their marriage rates
should have increased, particularly for men, because there was room to increase. As Gorgens
et. al. (2005) has shown, famine born individuals have su⁄ered adverse health consequences
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due to the famine. Thus their attractiveness as spouses was also likely to have su⁄ered.
The observed marriage rates were due to a combination of population changes and changes
in marital surpluses. To disentangle the two e⁄ects, we need to predict what would have been
the change in marital behavior due to population changes alone. To this end, we estimated
the harmonic mean and the CS MMFs using the 1982 census. The type of an individual is
associated with his or her age. In 1982, the marital behavior of 29-31 year olds would not
have been a⁄ected by the famine.12 Using the estimated 1982 marriage matching parameters,
we predicted what the marriage rates in 1990 would have been using 1990 population vectors.
Figures 3 and 4 show the predicted male and female marriage rates from the two models
respectively. For both genders, the predicted marriage rates from the harmonic mean MMF
often exceed 1, a nonsensical result. These violations occurred because the harmonic mean
MMF does not impose the required accounting identities, spousal substitution e⁄ects are
absent, and the changes in sex ratios of customary spousal age di⁄erences were large. Thus
as previous researchers have observed, the standard MMF used by demographers is a poor
empirical MMF.
On the other hand, the predicted marriage rates from the CS MMF behave sensibly.
In ￿gures 3 and 4, the predicted marriage rates are above average for the famine born
cohorts and below average for the adjacent aged birth cohorts. No accounting constraint
is violated. Note that actual female marriage rates were over 0.95 for most ages. Even
with large changes in sex ratios of the customary spousal age di⁄erences for the famine born
cohorts, their predicted marriage rates remained below 1. The predicted female marriage
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rates for famine born cohorts were very similar to those predicted for adjacent aged cohorts.
In other words, the CS MMF respects both the accounting constraints of MMFs and also
captures the ￿ exibility of individuals in their marital choices. These two attributes show the
advantage of the CS MMF over the harmonic mean MMF.
In ￿gure 3, famine born males had lower marriage rates than predicted and pre famine
born males had higher marriage rates than predicted. These two features are explained by
the hypothesis that famine born males generated lower marital surpluses than pre famine
born males. In other words, famine born males had lower total gains to marriage than their
1982 same aged peers.
Figure 4 shows that the discrepancies between predicted and actual female marriage
rates were small. These small discrepancies obscure the changes in total gains to marriage
for famine born females. The discrepancies between predicted and actual male marriage rates
show that total gains in 1990 changed substantially from 1982 estimated total gains. BSV
showed that predicted marital matches in 1990 were di⁄erent from actual marital matches.
Thus the small discrepancies between predicted and actual female marriage rates in 1990
obscure estimated changes in total gains to marriage between 1982 and 1990 for famine
a⁄ected birth cohorts.
BSV also estimated a CS MMF where the type of an individual was de￿ned by their
education and age. The predicted 1990 marriage rates were not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from
the simpler model where type depended only on age.
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4 The collective marriage matching model
Economists have developed empirical models on intra-household allocations. A benchmark
model is the collective model. The attractive feature of the collective model is that it is an
empirically tractable model of intra-household allocation where intra-household bargaining
power plays a central role in determining the allocation. An open question is whether the
collective model can be embedded into an equilibrium marriage matching framework. CSSa
and CSSb answer this in the a¢ rmative. We show how the collective model can be embedded
into the CS marriage matching framework. In addition, we also extend the CS model beyond
transferable utilities.
Again, consider a society in which there are I types of men and J types of women, and
population vectors M and F. Individuals choose who to marry if they want to marry and
also the type of marriage they want to engage in. An fi;j;sg marriage is a marriage between
a type i man and a type j woman in a s type living arrangement. A living arrangement may
depend on whether the couple is cohabitating or formally married, whether the wife works
or not, whether they have children or not, etc.
At the time of marriage, wages and non-labor income for each household are known. We
normalize the prices of all consumption goods to one. Each household has to choose spousal
labor supplies, public and private consumption. The rationale for including public good
consumption within marriage is to capture resources allocated to children in the marriage.
Consider an fi;j;sg marriage. Let Cijs (cijs) be the private consumption of the wife
(husband), Kijs the household￿ s expenditures on public goods and Hijs (hijs) the wife￿ s
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(husband￿ s) labor supply. We normalize the total amount of time for each individual to 1.




respectively. The felicity functions, Uijs(:) and uijs(:), depend on i and j to allow for dif-
ferences in home production technologies across di⁄erent types of marriages. If a woman
chooses not to marry, then i = 0 and if a man chooses not to marry, j = 0.
Let Wijs be the wife￿ s wage, wijs be the husband￿ s wage and Aijs be their joint non-labor
or asset income. Here we are making a very strong assumption that all marriages of the same
type, fi;j;sg, have the same wages and asset income. CSSa relaxes this strong assumption.
The hallmark of the collective model is that it assumes e¢ cient allocation of intra-
household resources. The e¢ cient allocation can be posed as a social planner solving:
max
fCijs;cijs;Hijs;hijs;Kijsg
Uijs[Cijs;1 ￿ Hijs;Kijs] + e pijsuijs[cijs;1 ￿ hijs;Kijs] (P1)
subject to the family budget constraint
cijs + Cijs + Kijs ￿ Aijs + WijsHijs + wijshijs
In problem (P1), the planner chooses family consumption and labor supplies to maximize
the weighted sum of the wife￿ s and the husband￿ s utilities subject to their family budget
constraint. The weight allocated to the husband￿ s utility is e pijs, e pijs 2 R+, where e pijs > 1
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implies the husband has more weight than the wife and vice versa. We will refer to e pijs as
the husband￿ s power. The social planner takes e pijs as given when solving the intra-household
allocation problem. The determination of e pijs itself occurs in the marriage market.
Let Qijs(e pijs;Wijs;wijs;Aijs) and qijs(e pijs;Wijs;wijs;Aijs) be the indirect felicity functions
of the wife and the husband, respectively. It is straightforward to show that:








The wife￿ s utility falls and the husband￿ s utility increases as e pijs increases. Equa-
tion (19) traces the redistribution of spousal utilities as the husband￿ s power increases. We
will now study how spousal labor supplies change as husband￿ s power changes. Denote
Hijs(e pijs;Wijs;wijs;Aijs) and hijs(e pijs;Wijs;wijs;Aijs) as the labor supplies for the wife and
husband that result from solving (P1). In general, it is di¢ cult to determine analytically
how spousal labor supplies respond to changes in e pijs. Building on Blundell et. al., CSSa
shows that if the public good is weakly separable from private consumption and leisure, and
if we restrict leisure (with suitably de￿ned individual private income) and the public good
to be normal goods for each spouse:
Proposition 5 The wife￿ s labor supply is increasing in e pijs whereas the husband￿ s labor
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4.1 Marriage decisions and outcomes
A woman can choose between I types of men and S type of living arrangements and also
to remain unmarried (unattached). So she has I ￿ S + 1 marital choices. Similarly, a man
has J ￿S +1 marital choices. For a particular woman of type j, her indirect utility from an
fi;j;sg marriage is:
Vijs(e pijs;Wijs;wijs;Aijs;￿ijs) = Qijs(e pijs;Wijs;wijs;Aijs) + ￿ijs + ￿ijs (22)
￿ijs is every type j woman￿ s invariant gain from marrying a type i man in living arrange-
ment s. It is independent of e pijs; Wijs; wijs; Aijs and ￿ijs. ￿ijs is used to ￿t the observed
marriage matching distribution. ￿ijs is the particular woman￿ s idiosyncratic payo⁄ which is
di⁄erent for every woman. ￿ijs is an i.i.d. extreme value random variable. If the woman
remains unmarried, denote her indirect utility as V0j(W0j;A0j;￿0j) = ￿0j+Q0j(W0j;A0j)+￿0j
where ￿0j is an i.i.d. extreme value random variable.
Let her vector of idiosyncratic extreme values be ￿j. The indirect utility from her optimal
choice will satisfy:
Vj(￿j) = max[V0j(W0j;A0j;￿0j);:;Vijs(e pijs;Wijs;wijs;Aijs;￿ijs);:;
VIjS(pIjS;WIjS;wIjS;AIjS;￿IjS)] (23)
The indirect utility to a particular type i man in an fi;j;sg marriage is:
vijs(e pijs;Wijs;wijs;Aijs;"ijs) = qijs(e pijs;Wijs;wijs;Aijs:) + ￿ijs + "ijs (24)
￿ijs is every type i man￿ s invariant gain from marrying a type j woman in living arrange-
ment s. It is independent of e pijs; Wijs; wijs; Aijs and "ijs. ￿ijs is used to ￿t the observed
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marriage matching distribution. "ijs is the particular man￿ s idiosyncratic payo⁄ which is
di⁄erent for every man. "ijs is an i.i.d. extreme value random variable. If the man remains
unmarried, denote his indirect utility as vi0(wi0;Ai0;"i0) = ￿i0 + qi0(wi0;Ai0) + "i0 where "i0
is an i.i.d. extreme value random variable.
The indirect utility from his optimal choice will satisfy:
vi("i) = max[vi0(wi0;Ai0;"i0);:;vijs(e pijs;Wijs;wijs;Aijs;"ijs);:;
viJ(piJS;WiJS;wiJS;AiJS;"iJS)] (25)
As in CS, if there are many women of each type, the quasi demand of type j women for
fi;j;sg marriages satis￿es:
ln￿ijs ￿ ln￿0j = (￿ijs ￿ ￿0j) + Qijs(e pijs;Wijs;wijs;Aijs) ￿ Q0j(W0j;A0j) (26)
where ￿ijs is the number of fi;j;sg marriages demanded by j type females and ￿0j is the
number of type j females who choose to remain unmarried.




i0 = (￿ijs ￿ ￿i0) + qijs(e pijs;Wijs;wijs;Aijs) ￿ qi0(wi0;Ai0) (27)
where ￿
ijs is the number of fi;j;sg marriages supplied by j type males and ￿i0 is the number
of type i males who choose to remain unmarried.
When the marriage market clears, ￿ijs = ￿
ijs = ￿ijs for all fi;j;sg sub-markets. In a
more general setup, CSSa shows that:
Proposition 6 A market equilibrium exists.
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The sketch of the proof is as follows. Consider any fi;j;sg sub marriage market. Holding
all other e pi0j0s0, i0j0s0 6= ijs, constant, as e pijs increases, weakly more type i men will enter into
fi;j;sg matches and weakly less of other types of matches. Weakly less type j women will
be willing to go into fi;j;sg matches and weakly more into other types of matches. Thus the
excess demand function for spouses in every fi;j;sg submarriage market satis￿es the weak
gross substitute condition. A standard result from general equilibrium theory says that a
marriage market equilibrium exists ( E.g. Mas-Colell, Winston and Green (1995: p. 646,
exercise 17.F.16C)).
Let e pijs = pijs under market equilibrium. Imposing equilibrium, the male and female net








= (￿ijs ￿ ￿0j) + Qijs(pijs;Wijs;wijs;Aijs) ￿ Q0j(W0j;A0j) (29)





(￿ijs ￿ ￿0j) + Qijs(pijs;Wijs;wijs;Aijs) ￿ Q0j(W0j;A0j)
2
+
(￿ijs ￿ ￿i0) + qijs(pijs;Wijs;wijs;Aijs) ￿ qi0(wi0;Ai0)
2
(30)
The left hand side of (30) is the total gain to marriage which is the same as in (17). The
right hand side of (30) depends on pijs, the husband￿ s power, wages and asset incomes. pijs
is endogenous. Thus in general, total gain is not equal to only exogenous variables as in CS.
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4.2 Market tightness, discrete and continuous spousal labor sup-
ply decisions




= (￿ijs ￿ ￿0j) + Qijs(pijs;Wijs;wijs;Aijs) ￿ Q0j(W0j;A0j)
￿ ((￿ijs ￿ ￿i0) + qijs(pijs;Wijs;wijs;Aijs) ￿ qi0(wi0;Ai0)) (31)
where Tij is marriage market tightness. Equation (31) is a generalization of (18). Unlike
proposition 2 which is silent on the determinants of marital output, equation (31) says that
important determinants of marital outputs include spousal wages and asset incomes. It is
important to emphasize that Tij and pijs are both endogenous variables and simultaneously
determined. Thus equation (31) is not a statement about the causal e⁄ect of Tij on pijs.
To obtain a causal statement, consider a change in an exogenous parameter, x. Let




















A change in x induces three changes in the husband￿ s power. The ￿rst is the e⁄ect of a
change in relative spousal invariant gains, b ￿ijs, on power. The second term is proportional
to the change in the di⁄erence in expected spousal utilities due to a change in Zijs caused by
a change in x. The third term is proportional to the change in marriage market tightness.
Since ￿ijs > 0, when market tightness increases, the husband￿ s power is predicted to fall.
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We can invert equation (31) to derive an expression for the husband￿ s power:
pijs = gijs(Tij;b ￿ijs;Zijs) (33)
The empirical implication of equation (33) is as follows. Holding b ￿ijs and Zijs constant, if
Tij stays the same, then pijs stays the same and total gains in equation (30) stays the same.
We now use equation (33) to derive empirical implications of our theory regarding the e⁄ect
of marriage matching on spousal labor supplies. Recall that Hijs(pijs;Wijs;wijs;Aijs) is the
hours of work of a wife of type j in an fi;j;sg marriage. Using proposition 5, equation (32)





That is, holding invariant gains to marriage and Zijs constant, the wife￿ s labor supply
depends inversely on marriage market tightness. The exogenous variables that can change to
a⁄ect tightness are the population vectors, M and F and determinants of marital surpluses
from other marital matches that are uncorrelated with b ￿ijs and Zijs.





Holding relative invariant gains to marriage, wages and asset incomes from fi;j;sg and
unmarried matches constant, the husband￿ s labor supply increases with marriage market
tightness.
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Another use of market tightness is to consider two types of marital matches fi;j;sg and
fi;j;s0g. For my application below, s are marriages in which a spouse works and s0 are
marriages in which a spouse does not participate in the labor market. Using equation (31),
market tightness is the same for both kinds of marital matches which implies:
￿ijs + Qijs(pijs;Wijs;wijs;Aijs) ￿ ￿ijs ￿ qijs(pijs;Wijs;wijs;Aijs) = ￿ijs0
+ Qijs0(pijs0;Wijs0;wijs0;Aijs0) ￿ ￿ijs0 ￿ qijs0(pijs0;Wijs0;wijs0;Aijs0) (38)
Consider a change in population supplies, x. Holding b ￿ijs and Zijs constant, using equa-












Equation (39) says that if the marginal utility of tightness is larger for living arrangement
s than s0, then pijs is smaller than pijs0 and vice versa. So if one can compare marginal
utilities of tightness between the two living arrangements, one can learn about their relative
husband￿ s powers.





= ￿ijs + qijs(pijs;Wijs;wijs;Aijs) ￿ ￿ijs0 ￿ qijs0(pijs0;Wijs0;wijs0;Aijs0) (40)
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@x < 0. Then:




=@Tij) = sign(pijs ￿ pijs0)
In words, holding b ￿ijs and Zijs constant, if the share of s living arrangements increases
relative to that of s0 living arrangements as tightness increases, the husband￿ s power in s living
arrangements exceeds that in s0 living arrangements. We will apply the above proposition to
interpret how the log odds of spouses participating in the labor market respond to variations
in tightness.
Finally, there is the equivalent of proposition 3:
Proposition 8 For every fi;j;sg, the net gains equations, (28) and (29), imply (30) and
(31), and vice versa.
5 Estimation and testing strategies
We have not yet attempted to estimate all the parameters of the collective marriage matching
model, partly because we have not yet established what is needed for identi￿cation, and
partly because there are so many more parameters to estimate. Although the collective
marriage matching model is a general equilibrium model, it admits decentralized estimation
and testing strategies as is usual for competitive equilibrium models. For any marital match,
fi;j;sg, the wives￿and husbands￿labor supply functions are respectively:
Hijs(pijs;Wijs;wijs;Aijs) & hijs(pijs;Wijs;wijs;Aijs)
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These functions only depend on exogenous parameters speci￿c to the fi;j;sg match, Wijs;
wijs; Aijs, and an endogenous parameter, husband￿ s power, pijs, which is also speci￿c to the
match. pijs encapsulates all general equilibrium concerns. Thus if we can ￿nd determinants
or proxies for pijs which are unrelated to Wijs; wijs and Aijs, we can estimate the subset
of labor supply functions for we have empirical speci￿cations for the labor supply functions
and the necessary data. These parameter estimates will be consistent even though we ignore
other marital matches where we do not have data and/or empirical speci￿cations for the
labor supply functions.
A similar decentralization result holds for estimating the marital matching equations,
total gains and marriage market tightness equations, (30) and (31), or equivalently net gains
equations (28) and (29). For any fi;j;sg match, in addition to Wijs; wijs; Aijs, and pijs,
we also need W0j, A0j , wi0 and Ai0. If we have empirical proxies for these variables and
empirical speci￿cations for the marital matching equations for a subset of marital matches,
we can estimate the marital matching equations for that subset.
5.1 Empirical evidence using market tightness
CSSa estimates the e⁄ect of changes in marriage market tightness on spousal labor supplies
using the 2000 US census. De￿ne an individual￿ s type as a combination of race, age and
education. For each gender, there are four contiguous age categories of 5 years each. The
ages are staggered by two years across gender to re￿ ect the fact that most men marry younger
women. The youngest female and male age categories are 25-29 and 27-31 respectively. For
each gender, there are two schooling categories: high school graduates (at least 12 and up
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to and including 15 years of education) and college graduates (16 years of education and
higher). Thus for each race and gender, there are 8 potential types of individuals. Since we
are only considering same race marriages, whites, blacks and hispanics, there are potentially
64￿3 = 192 types of marital matches for each society.
We treat each state s as a separate isolated society. With 50 states, there are potentially
192 ￿ 50 = 9600 cells across all sub-marriage markets. However, the majority of these
potential cells (marital match {i;j} ￿ state {s}) have few or no marriages. To avoid thin
cell problems, we delete a cell if the number of marriages in that cell is less than 5. For
most regressions, we have about 2400 observations. Most of the missing cells are due to
non-white marriages, with large spousal age di⁄erences, in states with small populations.
We also exclude mixed race couples to mitigate thin cells.13 Excluding thin cells from the
empirical analysis should not a⁄ect the consistency of my estimates. As discussed above, my
labor supplies regressions have to hold for any subset of marital matches.
In CSSa and the sample here, an observation is a cell. Mean T s
ij is -0.129 with a standard
deviation of 0.962. About half the cells involve white marriages and the rest are black and
hispanic marriages.14 Mean ages by cell are between 35-39 for women and 37-41 for men. For
both genders, there are slightly more high school graduates than college graduates. To control
for aggregate labor market conditions in an individual￿ s local marriage market, we de￿ne
the following three variables to characterize the earnings and asset income distributions.
First, conditional on positive annual labor earnings for a type of unmarried individual, we
construct the mean and standard deviation of log annual labor earnings for the distribution
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of unmarried individuals (wage and salary income). The second measure is the fraction of
individuals with zero labor earnings for each match type in each marriage market. Finally,
we construct the analogous variables for asset earnings, de￿ned from the Census as total
personal income minus wage and salary income.15 Note that we do not include marital
wages and asset incomes. In other words, we am using unmarried wages and asset income
proxies as control functions for the wages and asset income for both married and unmarried
individuals.
The labor force participation rates for husbands and wives are 94% and 73%, respectively.
We consider two measures of labor supply.16 My ￿rst measure is the log odds of LFP (labor
force participation). Conditional on participating in the labor force, my second measure of
labor supply is the log of usual hours worked per week. Mean usual hours worked for men
and women were 45 and 34 hours respectively.
CSSa shows that after controlling for own sex ratios, variations in substitutes￿sex ratios
also a⁄ect spousal labor supplies.17 With many di⁄erent sex ratios in the labor supply
regressions and the associated problem of multicollinearity, tightness provides a convenient
summary statistic for marriage market conditions. An advantage to using Tij in spousal
labor supply regressions, rather than sex ratios, is that the estimated coe¢ cient has a clear
behavioral interpretation. It alerts us to the conclusion that a labor supply regression with
labor market controls and only the own sex ratio as a proxy for marriage market conditions
has no clear causal interpretation.
Since tightness is endogenous, we instrument tightness by the population vectors in each
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state (by age and race and average educational attainment of their parents) twenty years
earlier.
Table 1 shows the estimated e⁄ect of market tightness on the log odds of labor force
participation (LFP) of wives and husbands. All regressions include state e⁄ects. These state
e⁄ects control for state di⁄erences in labor market conditions as well as di⁄erences in state
level invariant gains. Other controls include labor market and asset income controls at the
individual type and state level, and individual type e⁄ects. We interpret the labor force
participation status of a spouse as a living arrangement. In other words, marriages in which
the wife works are one living arrangement and marriages in which the wife does not work
are another living arrangement. Under this interpretation, the estimates of the coe¢ cient
on tightness in Table 1 provide estimates of @ ln
￿ijs
￿ijs0=@Tij in equation (41) where s denotes
marriages with a working wife and s0 those who do not.
Columns (1) to (3) are estimates for wives. Tij is a⁄ected by variations in invariant
gains and labor market conditions. We control for these variations with state and individual
e⁄ects. There are variations in invariant gains that we do not control for. Instrumenting
Tij with sex ratios at birth should mitigate the endogeneity problem. The point estimate
of 0.330 in column (1), which only includes state e⁄ects as the other covariates, shows that
instrumenting Tij is not su¢ cient to obtain the ￿right￿estimated sign. Column (2) adds
labor market conditions. In this case, the estimated coe¢ cient on Tij is -0.176 and it is
statistically di⁄erent from zero. Column (3) adds labor market conditions and individual
e⁄ects. The point estimate on Tij is -0.167 and the standard error is 0.065. So the point
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estimate is similar to that without individual e⁄ects but the standard error doubles.
Using the point estimate of -0.176 in column (2) as a benchmark, a one standard deviation
increase in Tij will decrease the log odds LFP of wives by 0.26 standard deviation. Thus
variation in tightness is quantitatively important for explaining variations in the log odds
LFP of wives across matches and/or societies. Ceteris paribus, women and men are more
willing to enter into marriages where the wife does not work when Tij increases. Equation
(41) and the signs of our estimates also imply that husband￿ s power is lower in marriages in
which the wife works than in marriages in which she does not.
Columns (4) to (6) are estimates for husbands. The point estimate of Tij is -0.034 in
column (4) which only includes state e⁄ects. Column (5) adds labor market conditions. In
this case, the estimated coe¢ cient on Tij is 0.145 and it is statistically di⁄erent from zero
at the 1% level. Column (6) adds labor market conditions and individual e⁄ects. The point
estimate on Tij is 0.015 and the standard error is 0.072. The point estimate is smaller than
in column (5) and the standard error is signi￿cantly larger. This fall in estimated precision
is the same for the other speci￿cations.
Using the point estimate of 0.145 in column (5) as a benchmark, a one standard deviation
increase in Tij will decrease the log odds LFP of husbands by 0.16 standard deviation. Thus
variation in tightness has a smaller standardized impact on the log odds LFP of husbands
than wives. This smaller impact by standard deviation is driven by the larger standard
deviation in log LFP of husbands across cells. Equation (41) and the signs of our estimates
also imply that husband￿ s power is higher for husbands who work than those who do not.
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[Insert Table 1 and 2 here]
The estimates in Table 1 show that changing marriage market conditions substantially
a⁄ect spousal LFP. These results are comparable to that found in the literature on the
response of female LFP to changes in labor market conditions. Since estimates of LFP equa-
tions are standard in the labor literature, it is useful that the collective marriage matching
model rationalizes these LFP equations in the context of the collective model.18
Table 2 columns (1) to (3) show the estimated e⁄ects of market tightness on the log usual
hours of work per week of working wives. Column (1) adds state e⁄ects. The point estimate
on Tij has the wrong sign and is statistically di⁄erent from zero at the 5% level. Column (2)
adds state e⁄ects and labor market conditions. The point estimate on Tij is -0.028 and the
estimated standard error is 0.005. Column (6) adds state e⁄ects, labor market conditions
and individual e⁄ects. The point estimate on Tij is -0.044 and the standard error is 0.010.
Thus adding individual e⁄ects lowers the estimated precision on Tij. The estimates in Table
2 is qualitatively similar to their counterparts in Table 1. The estimated magnitudes on ln
hrs/wk are smaller than for participation. Using the estimate in column (2) as a benchmark,
a one standard deviation increase in Tij results in 0.065 standard deviation decrease in ln
hrs/wk for wives. So variation in tightness explains less of the variation in mean log usual
hours of work per week of wives compared with log odds of LFP.
Columns (4) to (6) are estimates for husbands. As before, state e⁄ects alone in Column
(4) results in a estimate that is statistically not di⁄erent from zero. Column (5) adds state
e⁄ects and labor market conditions. The point estimate on Tij is 0.018 and the estimated
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standard error is 0.003. Column (6) adds state e⁄ects, labor market conditions, individual
e⁄ects. The point estimate on Tij is not statistically di⁄erent from zero at the 5% level. Thus
adding individual e⁄ects lower the estimated precision on Tij. The estimated elasticities on
hrs/wk are smaller than for participation. Using the estimate in column (5) as a benchmark,
a one standard deviation increase in Tij results in 0.068 standard deviation increase in ln
hrs/wk for husbands. So variation in tightness explains less of the variation in mean log
usual hours of work per week of husbands than of log odds LFP.
The empirical results discussed add to the literature on the estimated e⁄ects of changes
in marriage market conditions on spousal labor supplies. The estimates are qualitatively
consistent with both theory and the evidence in the literature. As already noticed in the
literature, it is important to control for labor market conditions. Otherwise, the point
estimates of the e⁄ects of Tij on spousal labor supplies consistently have the wrong sign.
The fact that variation in tightness a⁄ect labor force participation to a greater degree than
they a⁄ect hours of work per week is consistent with the ￿nding in the literature that
participation is more sensitive than hours of work to determinants of labor supplies. Finally,
we ￿nd theoretically consistent estimated e⁄ects for male labor supplies, which is uncommon
for this literature.
A caveat is important. The empirical evidence also shows that market tightness is not
always a su¢ cient statistic for own and substitute sex ratios. That is, in some spousal labor
supply regressions which include market tightness as an endogenous regressor, we cannot
reject the hypothesis that own and substitute sex ratios also a⁄ect spousal labor supplies.
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There are two non-mutually exclusive reasons for this ￿nding. First, the instruments may
not be valid.19 Second, the logit speci￿cation of spousal choice may be too restrictive.20
At this stage, our interpretation of the empirical results is that market tightness is a ￿rst
order approximation for marriage market conditions and not a su¢ cient statistic.
5.2 Do spousal labor supplies clear the marriage market?
While the previous empirical results and the results in the literature on the estimated e⁄ects
of changes in sex ratios on spousal labor supplies show that changes in marriage market
conditions a⁄ect spousal labor supplies, we do not know whether the estimated e⁄ects are
large enough to clear the marriage market. One cannot address this question unless we
estimate a structural model of marriage market clearing and spousal labor supplies.
CSSb does this for a particular set of marriages. Using the model in the previous section,
consider the set of marriages fi;j;sg in which both spouses work and there is no public goods
consumption. For convenience, we will also dispense with the s subscript. In this case, CSSb
shows that the intra-household allocation model is the same as that in CFL. CFL showed
that the wife￿ s and husband￿ s labor supplies are:
Hij(pij;Wij;wij;Aij) = ~ Hij[Wij;￿ij(pij))] (42)
hij(pij;Wij;wij;Aij) = ~ hij[wij;Aij ￿ ￿ij(pij)] (43)
where e Hij and e hij are standard Marshallian labor supply functions with ￿ij(pij) and
Aij ￿ ￿ij(pij) being asset incomes for the wife and husband respectively. Let husband￿ s
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power, pij, be a function of Rij; Wij; wij; Aij where Rij is a vector of other factors which
a⁄ect husband￿ s power. When we hold invariant gains to marriage, wages and asset incomes
constant, Rij consists of population vectors, M and F, and determinants of marital surpluses
from other marital matches including remaining unmarried.21




hA, E1 = Hw
HA, and F1 = Hr
HA. CFL shows:













CSSb shows that in the marriage market, the equilibrium quasi demand of type j women




= (￿ij ￿ ￿0j) + Q(Wij;￿ij(pij)) ￿ Q0j(W0j;A0j) (44)




= (￿ij ￿ ￿i0) + qij(wij;Aij ￿ ￿ij(pij)) ￿ qi0(wi0;Ai0) (45)
Denote the net gains by Nij = ln
￿ij
￿0j and nij = ln
￿ij
￿i0. Nij and nij are observable by the
researcher. Then the net gains reduced forms Nij and nij satisfy:
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Nij(Wij;wij;Aij;wi0;Ai0;W0j;A0j;Rij) = (￿ij ￿ ￿0j) + Q(Wij;￿ij(pij)) ￿ Q0j(W0j;A0j)
nij(Wij;wij;Aij;wi0;Ai0;W0j;A0j;Rij) = (￿ij ￿ ￿i0) + qij(wij;Aij ￿ ￿ij(pij)) ￿ qi0(wi0;Ai0)
Dropping the ij subscript for convenience, de￿ne B2 = Nr
NA, D2 =
nW












































Something like Proposition 11 should be expected. The CS class of marriage matching
models assumes that individuals make their marital choices based on comparing their indirect
utilities from di⁄erent choices. These indirect utilities depend on private consumption, public
34How does the marriage market clear? An empirical framework.
consumption and own labor supplies. Thus we should expect net gains to depend on the
determinants of husband￿ s power as well as own wages and asset incomes. What proposition
11 says is that since we can identify the determinants of husband￿ s power using spousal
labor supplies as per proposition 9, and by using net gains as per proposition 10, these two
di⁄erent ways of estimating these determinants should give the same results.
If one spouse does not work, there is only one spousal labor supply equation and the
identi￿cation of the determinants of husband￿ s power fails. CSSb shows that the determi-
nants of husband￿ s power continue to be identi￿ed by estimating the two net gains equations
when one spouse does not work.
An important contribution of CSSb is to include W0j, wi0, A0j, and Ai0 in the Rij vector.
That is, we include the opportunity costs of entering into the fi;jg marriage in Rij. Using
the data from the 2000 US census￿our preliminary empirical results largely show that when
an individual￿ s cost, i.e. W0j, wi0, A0j, or Ai0; of entering the marriage increases, his or
her spouse￿ s labor supply increases. Generally, the estimated e⁄ects of exogenous variables
on husband￿ s power using net gains are more consistent with the theory than from those
using spousal labor supplies. Finally, we cannot reject proposition 11 albeit the estimated
standard errors are large.
6 A lifecycle CS model
This section presents an earlier version of Choo Siow (2007), a two period lifecycle CS model
with no divorce and time varying supplies of new entrants. The objective of this section is
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to show that the CS framework extends naturally to lifecycle considerations.
Every adult lives for two periods, one and two. The age of a male is indexed by i and
the age of a female is indexed by j. In any period (year), the type of an adult is de￿ned by
his or her age. We may also call age one adults young and age two adults old. There is no
divorce. An adult whose spouse dies will automatically return to the marriage market in the
next period. For analytic convenience, widowed individuals and never married individuals
of the same age and gender are the same in the marriage market.
Let fmt
1;ft
1g be the number of young males and females who enter the society at year t.
Let ￿t
ij be the number of age i males who marry age j females at year t. Without divorce,















For convenience, the discount factor is set to one. Let ￿t
ij be the discounted within
marriage payo⁄s where an age i male marries an age j female in year t. This is the discounted
within marriage payo⁄ which is divided between the two spouses. Let vt
i be the expected
discounted payo⁄to a type i male of being available in the marriage market in year t. When
a type i male marries a type j female in year t, rt
ij is his expected discounted marriage






where ￿12 = 1, and ￿11 = ￿2j = 0.
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When an fi;jg couple marry, not all within marital payo⁄ accrues to the husband. Let
￿t
ij be the equilibrium share of the within marriage output of an fi;jg marriage in year t that
accrues to the wife. The systematic expected discounted payo⁄ to a type i male who enters
into a marriage with a type j female in year t consists of his systematic expected discounted
within marriage payo⁄, ￿t
ij ￿ ￿t










A particular type i male, g, who chooses to marry a type j female in year t will receive













ijg is the realization of an i.i.d. random variable with type I extreme value distribution.
Thus his expected discounted payo⁄, vt
ijg, consists of two components, a systematic dis-
counted payo⁄ (which is common to all such marriages) and an idiosyncratic payo⁄ which










The systematic expected discounted payo⁄ from not marrying at age i consists of two
components, a current payo⁄ ￿t
i0 and an expected discounted payo⁄ from being in the mar-
riage market again in the next period, rt
i0 = ￿i0vt
2 where ￿10 = 1 and ￿20 = 0. "t
i0g is the
realization of an i.i.d. random variable with type I extreme value distribution.
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The objective of male g in year t is to choose whether to remain unmarried or whom to

































Assume that the numbers of men and women of each type is large. Let ￿t
ij be the number
of type i males who want to marry type j females in year t. Let ￿t
i0 be the number of type
i males who want to remain unmarried in year t. Then the quasi-demand equation by type











ij ￿ ￿i0 ￿ r
t
i0 ;j = 1;2 (50)















i0 = c + ￿
t
i0 (52)
Turning to the equivalent equations to Equation (50) for women, let V t
j be the expected
discounted payo⁄ to a type j female of being available in the marriage market in year t.
Recall that if she marries a type i male in year t, she will receive a within marriage output
of ￿t
ij. Let Rt
ij denote her expected discounted end of marriage payo⁄. Rt
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where ￿21 = 1 and ￿11 = ￿i2 = 0. So the systematic expected discounted payo⁄to a type






Female utilities from marriage are modelled similarly to those of the males. A particular












ijk is the realization of an i.i.d. random variable with type I extreme value distribution.










Her systematic expected discounted payo⁄ from not marrying at age j consists of two
components, a current payo⁄ ￿t
0j and an expected discounted payo⁄ from being in the mar-
riage market again in the next period, Rt
0j = ￿0jV
t+1
2 where ￿01 = 1 and ￿02 = 0. ￿t
0jk is
the realization of an i.i.d. random variable with type I extreme value distribution. The
objective of female k in year t is to choose whether to remain unmarried or whom to marry











ij be the number of type j females who want to marry type i males in year t. Let
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￿t




























j0 = c + ￿
t
0j (56)
6.1 Marriage market clearing
In each year t, there are 4 submarriage markets, fi;jg = f1;1g;f1;2g;f2;1g;f2;2g. The
marriage market clears when all submarriage markets in the current and future years clear.
Assuming that the marriage market clears, given equilibrium shares, ￿t
ij 8fi;jg;t; the demand
for spouses by males is equal to the supply of spouses by females for every submarket. So
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ij does not depend on demand and supply conditions, mt0
1 or ft0
1 for any t0. Using (62)




































If marital outputs are year invariant, ￿t
ij = ￿ij, which is independent of t. Then (66)
imposes very strong restriction on the data. It says that:











































































for all t. Given ￿11, ￿12, ￿21 and ￿22; a sequence of new entrants, fmt
1;ft
1g, for t = 0;:::;









be solved for t = 0;:::. Given data from two adjacent time periods, t and t + 1, ￿11, ￿12,
￿21 and ￿22 can be estimated using equations (67) to (70). Thus (67) to (72) constitute a
dynamic MMF. Unlike static MMFs, the dynamic MMF is de￿ned by a system of forward
looking di⁄erence equations. The forward looking aspect of the marriage matching function
is due to the assumption that market participants are forward looking and therefore future
supplies will matter to their current decisions.
A constant ￿t
ij is not an innocuous assumption. Based on static models, CS has already
shown that the gains to marriage have fallen substantially between the seventies and eighties
in the US. Angrist and Evans (1999) and CS have shown that the legalization of abortion in
the US in the early seventies substantially reduced the gains to marriage for young adults.22
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BSV, summarized here, also shows that a time independent ￿t
ij is not plausible for China.
If ￿t
ij is time varying, then one needs to specify the dynamic process for ￿t
ij in the dynamic
MMF as well. Choo Siow (2007) provides preliminary estimates of a dynamic MMF with
long lived agents and exogenous divorce, assuming ￿t
ij = ￿ij and a time invariant distribution
of new entrants.
6.2 Analytic solution to a special case23
In general, the number of marriages of the dynamic MMF, equations (67) to (72), cannot
be solved for analytically. We will consider a special case. Let preferences be time invariant,
i.e. ￿t
ij = ￿ij. Since the sex ratio at birth is essentially one, let ft
1 = mt
1. Finally, let there






























where ￿12 and ￿22 are between 0 and 1, so that the in￿nite sums converge.
The equilibrium numbers of fi;jg marriages depend on past number of marriages, past,
present and future population supplies. The past numbers of marriages and past numbers of
young population supply matters because they give the numbers of available old individuals
in the current period. Future young population supplies matter because they predict how
many young adults will be around in the next period, which will a⁄ect the decisions of the
current adults. Standard static marriage matching functions on depend on current supplies
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of each type of individual (young and old). The dynamic MMF also includes future supplies
of the young.
7 Conclusion
This paper presents the CS MMF. This framework can be extended to incorporate the
collective intra-household allocation model. It also can be used to develop dynamic MMFs.
The paper also provides di⁄erent empirical applications.
Much remains to be done. Analytically, the substitution properties in the CS model
remains to be worked out. The question of global uniqueness of the CS model and its gener-
alizations needs to be addressed. The framework should be extended to include incomplete
contracting and endogenous marital dissolution.24
The estimation and testing of the collective marriage matching model is just beginning.
Estimating a dynamic MMF with time varying preference parameters and population sup-
plies is an important goal. Estimating this class of models using internet dating data as
in Hitsch, et. al. (2008) is also promising. Finally, the empirical framework here assumes
away the problem of unobserved heterogeneity. Empirical bilateral matching models with
unobserved heterogeneity on both sides of the market need to be developed.
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Appendix A
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1 + ￿22 +
p
￿12)2 + ￿11







1 + ￿22 +
p
￿12)2 + ￿11
As expected, the steady state numbers of marriages are homogeneous of degree one in
m1. The steady state numbers of marriages are also uniquely determined by m1 and the
preference parameters ￿11, ￿12 and ￿22.
Working with the linearized system around the steady state, (73) to (76) can be reduced
to a two equation ￿rst order di⁄erence equation system in ￿t
11 and ￿t
22. ￿t
12 can be obtained
as a function of ￿t
11 and ￿t
22 via (75). Let Gij(L) denote a lag structure of length fi;jg.
Taking logs of (73) to (76):























































































































































































We can ignore the equation (79) when solving the two equation di⁄erence equation system
in ￿t
11 and ￿t
















5 and zt = G(L)mt.































































Now we can put A￿1B = N￿1DN where D is the diagonal matrix of eigenvalues of A￿1B












Let N￿t = ￿t and ￿
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So we am done if we can show that ￿1 > 1 and 0 < ￿2 < 1.





























b) where A and B are the following:
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We need to show that the ￿rst eigenvalue is greater than 1 and the second is less than 1 but
greater than zero. The ￿rst is self evident, just taking the multiplier 1
2￿12￿11 and multiplying
it with a yields the desired result, we needn￿ t even use 2
p
b for this. Now moving to the
second part, showing that second lies between 0 and 1.
First let￿ s show that (a ￿ 2
p
b) > 0 or A2 ￿ 4B > 0. Evaluating the left side we get
a2 ￿ 4b = 4￿2
11￿2
12 > 0.
The above shows that eigenvalue is greater than zero. Now we need to show that its less
than one or (a ￿ 2￿12￿11)2 ￿ 4b < 0. Let me evaluate the left side:
(a ￿ 2￿12￿11)




























All terms are negative, hence the proof.
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Notes
1Becker￿ s classic papers on the marriage market (1973,1974; summarized in his 1991 book)
focused on these issues. Bergstrom (1997); Weiss (1997) and Waite (2000) survey the recent
literature.
2Even when observed, Botticini and Siow (2003) cautions against interpreting dowries
solely as transfers which clear the marriage market.
3Economists have proposed other behaviorally motivated marriage matching models with
strong apriori identifying restrictions. E.g. Del Bocca and Flinn (2006); Hamilton and Siow
(2007); Wong (2003). Exceptions include Fox (2007) and Hitsch, et. al. (2008).
4￿Models that analyze bargaining within existing marriages can give only an incomplete
picture of the determinants of the well-being of men and women. The marriage market is
an important determinant of distribution between men and women. At a minimum, the
marriage market determines who marries and who marries whom.￿Lundberg and Pollak
(1996).
5Seitz 2008 ￿rst proposes this statistic in a related context.
6This discussion builds on Pollak (1990); Pollard (1993,1997).
7Pollak (1990a) is an important contribution to this research agenda.
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8.... the frustrating search for a mathematically tractable and sociologically realistic
￿marriage function￿ . (Preston and Richards (1975))
9Dagsvik (2000); Dagsvik et. al. (2001) have a closely related model. See CS for a
comparison.
10" ￿ EV (0;1); with the cumulative distribution given by F(") = e￿e￿". E" = c which is
Euler￿ s constant ￿ 0:577:
11Porter (2007) has a related study. Also see Bergstrom and Lam (1994) and Francis
(2007).
12They were born at least 6 years before the famine began.
13Also market tightness for mixed race couples which include white spouses are very dif-
ferent from own race couples because there are so many more whites than other races in
the data. So we would need to have separate coe¢ cients on tightness for each mixed race
couples.
14This is the di⁄erence between individual observations, where 80% of the marriages are
among white couples, and observations by cell.
15To be precise, we measure the fraction of individuals with non-positive non-labor income
rather than zero non-labor income.
16I also estimated the supply of log of weeks worked per year. The estimated elasticities
were similar to that for usual hours of work per week.
17For each fi;j;sg marriage, I use sex ratios by age, by race, and by education as substi-
tutes￿sex ratios.
18Blundell, et. al. 2007 provides an alternative interpretation.
19The instrumental variable results presented here are quantitatively and qualitatively
similar to the OLS results which raises a question as to how powerful the instruments are.
20The emprical industrial organization literature usually rejects the basic logit speci￿cation
when estimating discrete demand models.
21R are distributional factors in CFL terminology. They are factors, other than de-
terminants of preferences and budget constraints in fi;j;sg marriages, which a⁄ect hus-
band￿ s power. Due to the set of marriages that they consider, CFL and CSSb work with
￿(R;W;w;A) notation directly.
22Also see Goldin and Katz (2002).
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23This section applies standard techniques in rational expectations models to the problem
at hand.
24E.g. Lundberg and Pollak (2003); Peters and Siow (2002); Chiappori, Iyigun and Weiss
(2008) have results under restrictive marriage matching assumptions.
25Shashi Khatri aided in these derivations.
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Figure 2: Sichuan sex ratios female ages, 1990
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60Table 1: Effects of market tightness on log odds of labor force participation of spouses   
   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Wives Wives Wives Husbands Husbands Husbands 
Tij  0.330  -0.176  -0.167  -0.034  0.145  0.015 
  (0.016)**  (0.032)**  (0.065)**  (0.019)  (0.041)**  (0.072) 
        
Observations 2330  2330 2330 2083 2083 2083 
R-squared  0.229 0.480 0.545 0.138 0.582 0.645 
States X X X X X X 
Labor  mark    X X   X X 
M  type    X    X 
F  type    X    X 
1 SD Tij  
increase
^ 
  -0.26     0.16  
 
Table 2: Effects of market tightness on log usual hours worked per weeks of spouses   
      
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Wives Wives Wives Husbands Husbands Husbands 
Tij  0.037  -0.028  -0.044  -0.003  0.018  -0.002 
  (0.002)**  (0.005)**  (0.010)**  (0.002)  (0.003)**  (0.008) 
        
Observations 2322  2322 2322 2380 2380 2380 
R-squared  0.248 0.499 0.525 0.095 0.330 0.343 
States X X X X X X 
Labor  mark    X X   X X 
M   t y p e     X     X  
F   t y p e     X     X  
1 SD Tij  
increase
^ 
  -0.065     0.068  
 
^ Fraction of SD increase of dependent variable due to 1 SD increase in Tij . 